We received comments on CSC Sugar`s proposed amendment and draft statutory submission; the petitioners, the American Sugar Coalition and its members;  Imperial Sugar Company; Cámara Nacional de Las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera (Cámara); the Sugar Users Association (SUA); international Sugar Trade Coalition, Inc.; and the Corn Refiners Association. In order to obtain a definitive amendment to the AD Agreement, Commerce has taken into account all comments filed in the registration of the Suspension Agreement and, if justified, has made amendments to the draft AD Amendment of 4 December 2019 on the basis of those observations. The 2014 agreements provide for a review every five years, which the D.O.C. had previously announced would begin in December of this year, while results were only expected in a few months. As a result, U.S. sugar prices have been artificially squeezed — and some sugar prices in the U.S. Pipe refineries and their workers have been injured by a deliberate lack caused by the government. And Mexican companies have benefited from higher prices, set by the suspension agreements. In 2014, U.S. sugar processors filed anti-dumping and countervailing complaints against Mexico.
The resulting high tariffs severely disrupted trade with Mexico, but the U.S. and Mexican governments negotiated agreements to impose minimum prices and maximum sales of sugar from Mexico, effectively creating a managed trade regime that constrained U.S. sugar prices beyond levels prescribed by Congress. The suspension agreement completely eliminates the injurious effects of Mexican tomatoes at unfair prices, prevents price undercutting and essentially eliminates dumping, while trade can examine up to 80 Mexican tomato producers and U.S. sellers per quarter or more. In addition, the agreement also closes the loopholes in previous suspension agreements which, in certain circumstances, allowed sales at reference prices, and provides for an inspection mechanism to prevent the importation of poor quality tomatoes in poor condition from Mexico, which could have negative effects on the market. „The decision to reduce sugar trading conditions to an earlier 2014 deal marks a blow to the Trump administration by reversing its first-first-day trade deal.” Pursuant to Section 734(d) of the Act, Commerce finds that the suspension of the investigation is in the public interest and that effective U.S. oversight of the agreement is feasible. Section 734(a)(2)(B) of the Act provides that the public interest includes the availability of goods and the relative effects on the competitiveness of the domestic industry producing like products, including effects on employment and investment in that sector. Where a domestic producer requests an administrative check on the status and compliance with the Agreement, trade shall take these factors into account in carrying out that verification. . .