Each party to a judgment-sharing agreement promises to contribute, in proportion to its percentage of shares, to any judgment rendered by another party or party to the agreement. Anyone can also promise to try to arrive at an overall comparison and, if not, to require that the settlement agreement reduce the liability of non-appearing defendants by the defendant`s percentage (not just the amount of the defendant`s payment). Other provisions may also be included in the agreement, but the part of the judgment provides the essential glue of the pact. Our feed encourages our customers to share judgments, not our opponents. The genius of the exchange of judgments lies in the cohesion it imposes among the accused. It therefore undermines the applicants` ability, in a typical price-fixing case, to induce defendant A to an early settlement by offering a discount on its likely share of any compensation. Accused A – perhaps the most guilty of all – likes the idea of retiring at a low price. The other defendants continue to be jointly and severally liable for the actual damage two times three times less the amount of the advance settlement (not the actual damage less the anticipated reference amount by three). A judgement sharing agreement removes the early trade option. Another argument often made in favor of disclosure is that secret alliances between defendants can create inappropriate bias and mask the bias and motivation for the testimony.
These arguments attempt to mimic the arguments against the „Mary Carter” agreements, in which the applicant has agreed with a defendant who agrees to participate in the hearing and can benefit financially if the applicant recovers from the unsetted part. See z.B. Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 p. 2d 1063 (kan. 1985) (identification of a great potential for injustice if the secret colonies are not passed on to other parties and to the jury); Ex rel. Vapor Corp v. Narick, 320 s.E.
2d 345 (W. Va. 1984) (disclosure of Mary Carter`s agreement to other parties and juries being required). However, significant differences between the judgment-sharing agreements and mary Carter`s agreements make it necessary to conclude that judgment-sharing agreements should not be discovered. First, the division of judgments agreements do not allow the defendants to benefit from another defendant to request the applicants. Unlike Mary Carter`s agreements, an alliance between the defendants is not unusual or unexpected. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for applicants to participate in the settlement of the defendant`s claims for contributions and compensation. On the contrary, most state laws provide that an action for compensation or contribution occurs only when an adverse judgment has been rendered. . . .