The agreement also provides that when a prisoner applies for an order in a case for which a prisoner has been filed, it is a request for a decision on all matters for which prisoners have been filed by the same „[S]tate”. Article III(d) In this context, the different federal districts have been separately designated as `[S]tates`. See United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1979), certificate refused, 446 U.p. 920 (1980). Prosecution of other charges that have not been the subject of any prisoner is not permitted by the agreement unless they result from the same transaction. (Article V(d)) ] It is not clear whether the examination of the latter is compulsory. Applicability of the Agreement: The Agreement applies only to „a person who has served a sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary or penitentiary establishment” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)) and therefore does not apply to a person awaiting trial. See United States vs.
Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9th Cir.), certificate refused, 449 U.p. 880 (1980); United States v. Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the agreement only applies to a prisoner based on a pending „indictment, information or complaint” requiring a „procedure” (Articles III (a) and IV (a)), the agreement does not apply to a prisoner based on a probation warrant. See Reed, above. The procedure for the order of prisoners for a suspended offence is set at 18 U.S.C 4214 (b).
The agreement also does not apply to probation criminals. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.p. 716 (1985). In addition, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161(j) requires that a U.S. attorney who knows that an accused is serving a sentence in a penal institution must immediately request the presence of the accused at trial or request the incarceration of a prisoner. If the prisoner requests a trial and is made available for criminal prosecution, the speedy Trial Act time limits apply, but do not begin to run „until the accused is actually present for the purposes of the plea”. See H.R.Rep.
No. 93-1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36. In the event of an objection between the time limit laid down in the Agreement and the Law on Rapid Judicial Procedure, the strictest application should be applied. United States, Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 356-57 n. 24 (1978). See Odom, above, in 231 („The Detainer Act and the Speedy Trial Act deal with the same purpose. To the extent possible, the interpretation of laws should not be contradictory. »). Extradition rights under state law: In Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S.
433 (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that Article IV(d) respected a prisoner`s extradition rights in accordance with the laws of the state of detention, so that he was entitled to a hearing before being transferred from the state of Pennsylvania detention to the state of New Jersey. However, this judgment does not apply to prisoners serving federal sentences, as the United States has neither passed the Uniform Extradition Act nor enacted any other law providing for the right to be heard. See Mann v. Warden, 771 F.2d 1453 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475 U.P. 1017 (1986). This is the position of the Criminal Division as state prisoners, sanctions in federal institutions under contracts under 18 United States. C purge. . . .